Non published version, not for quotation.
A version intended for publication has been submitted to Science as Culture, same title, authors : D. De Waele, V. Smets and D. Vandendriessche

Democracy put on the scene.
Backstage reflections on the rationality of the Public-Science-Policy connection.

Danny DE WAELE & Val?rie SMET
IUAP-UGent, Vakgroep Grondslagen en geschiedenis van het recht, Prof. Koen RAES

In what follows we give backstage reflections: we position ourselves at a ’critical distance’ of a scene on which play the actors Policy and Science for a Public, with the media in their mediating role. This critical distance allows us to have an overview, to give a general comment, comparable to the one offered by a ’trend watcher’, neither more nor less. ’What ’s the trend of the season?’

In the Science part, we specifically focus on biotechnology (worked out by Danny De Waele, PhD in Biology with 30 years participating observer experience in biotechnology and its social aspects studies, as an old stager not inexperienced in trend watching) and in the Policy part, we focus on processes of decision- and policymaking (by Val?rie Smet, PhD student in Moral sciences, with fresh courage on apprenticeship in social-political research).

’Science going Public’ can be seen as a new trend of participatory Technology Assessment (pTA), itself a third or fourth kind of TA. TA aims to assess the impact on society of novel developments in science and technology.

TA has a history, is institutionalized and has public or societal intentions. Before the institutionalized TA era, Science and Policy had of course their connections. Instead of referring to a/the ’Public’, reference was rather made to ’Society’, in general, anonymous, passively aimed at, and not at all participatory.

The TA history started in the U.S. in 1972 with the setting up of the -well-financed- Office of Technology Assessment OTA, linked to the U.S. Congress (the Congress acted as what we now would call the ’Public’, or the ’Citizen’). OTA officers assessed diverse technologies, starting that time with information technology, then new medicines, biotechnology, new materials, etc. In the assessing process, forecasting and foreseeing (of the impact of new technologies on society) were stressed. Assessing the societal impact consisted in an analysis of the so-called ’broad socio-economical aspects of new developments in science & technology’, ranging from classical aspects as e.g. employment and education to environmental aspects and ’upcoming’ ethical aspects, and considering classical concerned organizations as e.g. trade unions up to ’novel’ organizations as consumer organizations and ’green’ organizations. (Lobbying groups were at some level recognized.)

Out of a 1st generation TA, a 2nd and 3rd generation TA was developed, with more or other societal aspects of science and technology under study. TA institutes outside the U.S. were set up, OTA in the U.S. was closed down. Participatory TA (pTA) was given birth, as an attempt to organize ’real’ participation of the ’Public’ or the ’Citizen’ in the development of science and technology, e.g. in the form of consensus conferences with policy officers, experts and laymen.

Also bio(techno)logy has his history and historiography (remember studies on the ’foundation’ of a modern, ’molecular’ biology -a biology analyzed in terms of ’molecules’- by Rockefeller in the nineteen twenties, with a biology discipline programmed such as the successful physics -analyzed in terms of ’atoms’- of those days).

The recent history of biotechnology, out of the genetics and molecular biology that were shaped along with the discovery of structure and function of DNA, emerged in the nineteen seventies with the technical possibilities of recombinant DNA (recDNA): the possibility to recombine foreign DNA (of organisms unrelated to the host) in the DNA of a host organism, followed by expression of the foreign DNA. From the beginning, the recDNA technique was recognized to pose safety risks in and outside the lab as well as health risks for researchers and neighbors. At the famous Asilomar Conferences (in 1973 and 1975), researchers themselves asked for guidelines and installed temporary moratoria on working with (types of) recDNA, and they became aware of the role of the media in the ’going public’ of science1. Along with the undeniable scientific importance of recDNA techniques (gaining knowledge), with the growing possibilities of recDNA applications (in medicine, in pharmacology), and with the as sufficient considered effect of the guidelines on problems of safety and health, moratoria were heaved up, risk-analysis became more organized and researchers themselves less (or less explicitly) self-critic, more an interested and less visible party in a more mediated recDNA debate, held by several concerned parties.

Between 1980 and 1990 biotech firms came and went, patenting gained importance, conflicts arose between fundamental & applied research and between public & private R&D, the neo-liberal ideology gained dominance (was less criticized) and criticism on ’Science in Society’ was raised mainly outside the biotech labs, lobbying grew, the mentioned TA initiatives differentiated, etc.

From 1990 till now, with the entrance on the market of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), an at times vividly mediated ’public GMO debate’ dealt with problems of users/consumers acceptance of GMO products, with the issue of field tests on GMOs and its related problems of ’good agricultural practices’, environmental safety and food safety above problems of health safety (not at least influenced by several crises with ’contaminated’ food and feed in Europe), with trade conflicts between U.S. and Europe or between ’western’ world and ’developing’ world, etc.

So, from the beginning, with the recombinant DNA debate, the media played a role in rendering public what was at stake in biotechnology. Initially, the addressed Public was considered as rather passive, as but receiving and consuming information, as ’to be informed’. With the growing importance of a Science based biotech industry, the message towards the Public became less ’neutral’, less ’disinterested’, less ’purely or directly informative’ and the Public (or some parts of it) was addressed more purposeful, more goal-directed: Science became explicitly ’mediated’. This was illustrated e.g. by the importance of -often-preliminary- press releases on new findings by biotechnologists: more a strategy to impress public and private financers and competitors, than a simple or straightforward information supply for future consumers. The so-called general public opinion became alerted by field tests of GMOs and by the approval of GMOs for market and trade, by the rising media activities of non-classic social organizations criticizing GMOs and by the food security crises. The Public consists no longer (or not only) of passive consumers of information, but (also) of selective food consumers, of ’disbelievers’ not wanting GMOs, active in lobbying at different democratic and not-so-democratic levels, some of them becoming ’activists’, etc.

This evolution towards a differentiated and active involvement of ’the’ Public in biotechnology can be considered as the trigger for Science and Policy to ’organize’ (to orchestrate, etc.) public participation.

All this shows a complex Public-Science-Policy connection, with the following general characteristics:

- It is a complex, dynamic process with a history, and with ongoing interrelationships (connections) between different actors with different concerns and changing weights and power.
- Explicit and implicit matters are at stake, hidden-or-not agenda’s, visible and invisible transactions, facts and fictions, short-term actions and long-term concerns, and self-declared ’rational’ or as ’irrational’ (of opponents) depicted thinking and behavior.
- Risks occur, uncertainties, crises, and unforeseen reactions.
- This connection is at play on international, multinational and local levels in a neo-liberal economy.

Towards an as such described complex Public-Science-Policy connection, would we position the efforts of Science and Policy to ’organize’ the public participation in biotechnology matters, efforts indeed to make order out of this permanently changing web, to rationalize (to steer efficiently) what seems to be messy, uncontrollable: ’Democracy put on the scene’.

In Belgium e.g., we recently had the following initiatives to organize public participation in bio(techno)logy:

- Public "Evening debates on biotechnology in agriculture and food", organized by VIB (Vlaams Interuniversitair Instituut voor Biotechnologie, www.vib.be), the Flemish Interuniversity Institute for Biotechnology, April 17th and May 12th of 2001: scholars, interested laypersons and experts participated in a discussion process; the public had an audience role; and the (contacted, of course) media covered the event.
- Citizen panel on GMOs at the community level (Beernem, in the Flemish region), organized by the ’Foundation for the future generations’ (’Fondation pour les g?n?rations futures’, www.fgf.be) for the Ministry of Health and Environment, April 26th of 2003 (similar to a previous citizen panel in Gembloux, in the Walloon region, April 12th of 2003): 9 citizens in company of experts; covered by the media.
- Citizens’ conference on genetic testing, "Is it in my genes?" organized by the King Baudouin Foundation (Koning Boudewijn Stichting, www.kbs-frb.be), from January to March of 2003: 30 citizens and experts; public; media coverage.
- Public forum on GMO food, "New impulses for the debate on genetically modified food" organized by viWTA (Vlaams Instituut voor Wetenschappelijk en Technologisch Aspectenonderzoek, www.viwta.be), the Flemish Institute for Science and Technology Assessment for the Flemish Parliament, May 24th, 25th and 26th of 2003: 16 citizens and experts; public; media coverage.
- Not covered by the media: the so-called ’public files’ of the Biosafety Advisory Council (the Belgian advisory board on GMOs, www.biosafety.be) and its Working Group on Public Information. In these public files, available at the website of the council, "readable and understandable" (for a general public) information on GMO dossiers is given by the concerned biotechnology actors.2

The debates, panel, conference or forum were ’guided’ by the organizers.

The outcomes of these events were diverse: press reports, a reflection/opinion text3, general reports of the public participation processes, specific evaluation reports4, and advices5. Citizens or public expressed their satisfaction of the learning process: they gained insight, became more aware and informed, could express their opinions, etc. To be noted -preliminary- as an outcome too, was the critical side remark of an organizer who considered the GMO issue as ’too late’ for pTA. (Are public GMO debates then but a media hype passed by? What is next: nano(bio)technology? In what way, in which form will public participation be organized then?)

Analysis and ’backstage reflection’ - We informed us by all ’public’ available means or we were present, we read the outcomes, read an essay pleading for public space for as well scientists as laypersons6, and we interviewed, listened to or documented us about concerned people (experts; working group members). (For our analysis within the confinements of a backstage trend watcher, we used the common social scientists’ ’soft’ methods of survey analysis - no statistics, no experiments, no in depth analysis worthy of a 4 years demanding PhD in sociology of science.)

The results of these participatory TA initiatives were, yes, a success for the organizers (it is their task/their reason of existence); were, yes, a becoming more informed of the handful citizens; were, yes, a success for the invited experts, because present ’on the scene’ (recognized authority). But, no, these results didn’t match with the intended purpose: a participation of a more general Public in the Science-Policy complex. More information, more knowledge - more doubts too. Advises, a lot of discourse, ephemeral media attention. But no participation at not any level. No empowerment.

Backstage this organized participation of a public in the as complex described Public-Science-Policy connection, we can but make the following reflection: maybe this represents a well-intended experiment on ’public participation’, but then one as in outdated experimental theatre, a pTA theatre, a theatre of democracy. ’Playing Public, Science and Policy in a Mediated act.’ "Theatre", because it is a setting up, a putting on the scene, an orchestration, a rationalization of complexity, a fiction, a ritual, ’rationality as ritual’7. The complexity-with-a-history of TA, biotechnology, public and media, as described higher, is deliberately8 reduced to and recast as a manageable play-acting on a small stage in a limited time. (And like in any theatre, this ’real world’ of GMO developments is at play outside, although some selected representatives play a role inside or backside the theatre.) "Outdated" because of its well-intended aims of ideological education and steering of a hypothetically general public, because of its ’political correctness’ in which opportunism, cynicism and the like are not on stage.

In which play are we supposed to participate or to believe and then go home and be assured? Can we act ’as if’ any longer? Is this ’theatre of democracy’ convincing? Does it enhance democratic credibility? Is this (a ritualized kind of) dealing with a democratic deficit concerning the societal use/embedding of science and technology? Should we announce it as ’Good morning… Techno-democracy!’?

No, such as in Hans C. Anderson’s tale "The clothes of the emperor", somebody has to say ’The emperor has no clothes on’.

Why do we need to say this, what went wrong? We think that a friction in the hopes and fears surrounding a democratic biotechnology debate becomes clear, becomes unavoidable. Some say, the biotechnology debate becomes too polarized, polarized between pro GMOs and contra GMOs. They want to balance it. They want to democratize it. Balance it where: in an artificial and mediated setting of Public, Science and Policy, far from the real centers of decision? And democratize how and what? Democratize the debate, the discourse, or changing a science and technology process at all levels? Giving the democratic floor to the ’demos’ itself, to the -via a social consultative system- organized democracy of corporate organizations, political parties, non-governmental organizations, etc. (the ’social midfield’), or ’organize’ the non-organized ’citizens’? Some believe in top-down organized participative democracy, or in parliamentary/representative democracy, or in organized ’social consultation’, others not. Escaping these intentions to democratize, canalize, yes, rationalize a social debate, and disbelieving the good intentions and real impact of it, grassroots organizations, alter-globalist and anti-GMO movements force their own way through what is been called the ’Science-Technology-Capitalism complex’ or ’techno-industrial complex’ or ’political/economical techno-structure’, they make public i.e. the biotechnology debate by tackling frontally and directly GMO field trials, seed imports and stocks, seats of multinationals, research labs, expert committees, biosafety procedures and authorization policies, etc., invoking legitimate defense (of a public good, for a common future) when accused of illegality.9

So, concerning biotechnology, there is not only a polarization between pro’s and con’s in general (pro or contra GMOs). Current trends in the ’making public of biotechnology’ lay also bare a polarization between ’believers’ and ’disbelievers’ in the social debate on biotechnology, between their respective modes of action, their respective how’s and why’s. (Without going more deeply into definitions, we rather would generalize it as a polarization of ’ideologies’, ideology seen as a mixture of ideas, ideals, values, beliefs, moral justifications, etc. that direct one’s sociopolitical behavior.) At one side (hereby keeping in mind that ’the real GMO world’ is at play outside), we could place what we described as an experimental pTA theatre (top-down orchestrated, maybe well-intended, social midfield minded, illusion of or ritualized democracy, belief in discourse society, stressing a ’learning process’, not just pro or contra, rather reformist, etc.), and at the other side the ’GMO activists’ (bottom-up, democratically disillusioned, symbolic actions rather than discourse, confronting, trial of strength mentality, discourse of power and empowerment, explicitly in opposition: contra a GMO world, radical revolutionary?, etc.).

A side effect of this polarization is that it concedes no broad ideological breathing space; it leaves no room for a complex view, for scattered critique, doubts (feelings of powerlessness, paradoxes, contradictions, complicities, etc.) or disagreement, for other styles of engagement; even more, it annihilates or disparages other approaches. In other words, a need makes itself felt to counterbalance dominant discourses and beliefs (e.g. the belief in pTA experimental theatres). No monopoly should be conferred to one kind -in content and in style- of science and technology analysis, criticism, or engagement (e.g. anti-GMO movements don’t have a ’natural’, self-evident monopoly of the Only True Opposition or Engagement). There isn’t but one pro and one contra, one bad guy and one good guy.

For the present, we’ll leave it here at offering a reflection, at pointing out a problem, at pleading for more pluralism, for some kind of multiculturalism or ’subculturalism’ (’subversion’ has many faces) in whatever ’democratic debate on biotechnology’.10

What leads us to a next ’demystification’, shown in studies as e.g. De mythe van de parlementaire democratie: Een Belgische analyse of Wilfried Dewachter11, namely that the Policy process (rather called ’Decision- & Policymaking’) is not organized to make participatory TA really happen. We consider the following six characteristics:

1. Decision- & Policymaking is a complex process in which a great number of actors are involved (politicians, administration, think tanks, advisory bodies, interest groups, etc.), all having their own concerns and interests (sometimes causing conflicts). It is a process of debate, opinions, influence and power12, and it consists of many phases, from policy initiation, over policy formulation, to policy implementation and, sometimes, even policy evaluation. All these phases have their own types of inputs, and changing actors play a big role in each phase. So, with regard to recent pTA initiatives, a critical remark can be made that in the complex process of decision- & policymaking, there is no room for the outcomes of tiny groups of citizens in panels or conferences, nor for popularizing essays.

2. Decision- & Policymaking is also a non-linear process (linear, in the sense of having a beginning, middle and end): policy measures have a previous history, often but tiny adaptations to former policy initiatives or measures are being made. Policy-makers tend to follow rules and guidelines based on earlier experience instead of basing their decisions on anticipating choices13. Therefore, no big policy changes can be expected:
"Lacking overriding goals and clear-cut ends, policy-makers tend to operate within an existing pattern or framework, adjusting their position in the light of feedback in the form of information about the impact of earlier decisions."14
No major turns occur in decisions made on policy topics. Therefore, as another critical remark regarding pTA, the chance that results of citizen panels become incorporated into major changes on the policy-level, is very small.

3. In general, the rationality of the decision-making process is overestimated15. Various types of information come into the decision-making process, from political interests, beliefs and values to scientific information, and not all of them are estimated having the same value. The impact of scientific information on the policy process is always overestimated. Scientists tend to be far too optimistic about the impact of their work when it comes to policy (there is general agreement on the ’underutilization’ of scientific research in policy)16.

4. Power plays a very important role in decision-making. Not all actors have the same power in the decision-making process; sometimes some actors are excluded from the debate and negotiations; some groups have a bigger weight in the debate than others (e.g. weight of pharmaceutical industry in the health policy debate). Interest groups and activists are not always heard, or some of them are heard and override the other interest groups (i.e. the impact on agricultural policy of the Belgian farmer’s organization, the ’Boerenbond’). And not every group in society has its representatives or pressure groups in the decision-making process. When it comes to GMOs we have to notify that the biotechnology industry has a great amount of power, and therefore also determines the direction of the debate and decisions made on the topic. Economy tends to have a big impact on policy decisions regarding industry (e.g. the debate in Belgium on night flights of DHL, a delivery company in need of expansion). Industry in capitalist society has enormous power, often resulting in an industry-shaped policy and government no longer being able to regulate and control the industry (e.g. the power of pharmaceutical industry). We also refer to Wilfried Dewachter’s study on Belgian policy-making, pointing out that policy is made by a number of elites that have power and do everything to keep it, rather than by a general representative group that equals the composition of society.

5. The debate on technological developments as e.g. biotechnology is very technical, and policy-makers and politicians are not specialized enough to understand all the evolutions. Therefore experts are asked to help determine the direction of policy on biotechnology, and this is often organized by means of advisory boards. These people gain a lot of power and are often connected to the (bio)technology industry. They have other loyalties than solely taking into account ’citizens’ opinions’. Considering the impact of these experts on the outcomes of decision-making, the chances of the societal debate to direct biotechnology are almost inexistent.

6. Since the establishment of the European Community, and its gaining power, Belgium (as is the case for the other member states) can no longer freely choose his policy when it comes to certain topics. The European Union gives guidelines, recommendations, and laws and also has the right and power to sanction member states that do not follow them. Considering the fact that the European Union17, influenced by the American power and policy, adopted a pro GMO standpoint, a policy that is more critical on GMOs is almost excluded.

These six characteristics of decision- and policymaking processes point out that the possible impact of public GMO debates or citizen panels on actual decision-making is very limited. Furthermore the outcomes of the panel discussions are not compulsory (as is the case for referendums). Questions can also be made about the representation of the public (see hereafter, the contribution of Laurent De Sutter).

Therefore we conclude that the participation of citizens in decision-making processes is overestimated, and also false (as pointed out by Wilfried Dewachter: decision-making in Belgium does not always work in a democratic way and many elites determine the decision process outside the public debate).

NOTES

1 More precisely, as I mentioned in "Veel ethiek voor weinig veld Oversized ethics for a small field" (DE WAELE, D. 1997/1998, Biol. Jb. Dodonaea 65: 22-58, my contribution at the Symposium ’Populations: natural and manipulated’, organized by the Royal Society of Natural Sciences Dodonaea, 29 October 1997, University of Gent), after the first recDNA experiments, an international committee of scientists proposed a moratorium for some experiments. At the Asilomar 2 conference in 1975, guidelines were proposed in order to regulate recDNA research. At this conference, lawyers and journalists were present and, for the first time, the recDNA issue became also a public matter. This was not the intention of most scientists and not at all the intention of the Molecular Biology Establishment as James Watson called it in The DNA story: A documentary history of gene cloning (WATSON, J. D. & TOOZE, J., 1981, W. H. Freeman, San Francisco). The concerned scientists wanted to regulate their experiments by themselves, without external intervention, supervision or bureaucracy. It went otherwise and with variable result: recDNA guidelines were installed, were evaluated in 1980 in the US as too stringent and were relaxed, and in 1983 the US National Institute of Health permitted the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs. In 1990 in Europe, the Council of the European Communities regulated the contained use of genetically modified microorganisms (written in directive 90/219/EEC), and the deliberate release into the environment of GMOs (directive 90/220/EEC). Was continued…
2 In Belgium, a Royal Decree of 1998 for the deliberate release of GMOs, which implemented the European directive 90/220/EEC into national law, stipulates that each GMO application dossier needs to contain a proposal of information for the public. The Service of Biosafety and Biotechnology (SBB) developed guidelines for the compilation of such dossiers, in collaboration with the "experts of its working group on public information". For citations and further information see DEVOS, Y., RENCKENS, S. & MOENS, W. (2003), "Guidance note for the compilation of the public dossier within the framework of the deliberate release of transgenic plants for experimental purposes", Report of SBB of the Scientific Institute of Public Health, Royal Library of Belgium, Deposit N? D/2003/2505/20.
3 E.g. the reflection text on Biotechnology in agriculture and food, by the scholars and laypersons of the 2001 VIB-debates, handed over to the president of the Flemish Parliament, June 1st of 2001.
4 E.g. the one ordered by VIB on its 2001 debates, as part of a VIB social research project, written by VANDENABEELE, J., GOORDEN, L. & VAN GELDER, S. (members of STEM, "Onderzoeksgroep Milieu, Technologie en Technologiemanagement", Research group Environment, Technology and Technology management, Antwerp, www.ufsia.ac.be/STEM): "Leken en experten uitgedaagd? Evaluatie van door VIB georganiseerde debatavonden over biotechnologie in landbouw en voeding: Naar een vernieuwend debat over biotechnologische toepassingen in landbouw en voeding", VIB, August 2001.
5 E.g. the advice of the viWTA/Public forum, handed over to the Flemish Parliament, May 2003.
6 GOORDEN, L. (2004) De horzel en het luie paard: Over technologische groepsspurt en morele verbeelding, Uitgeverij Van Halewyck, Leuven.
7 Years ago, this concept was already used in relation to GMOs by Les LEVIDOW & Joyce TAIT in "Containing perceived risks of GMO releases: Regulation as judicial ritual" (paper presented during the third European Conference on Technology Assessment, ECTA-3, treating Technology and Democracy, Copenhagen, November 1992), in which they extended the ’rationality as ritual’ perspective as developed still earlier by other sociologists of science, e.g. WYNNE, B. (1982) Rationality and ritual: The windscale inquiry and nuclear decisions in Britain, British Society for the History of Science; MEYER, J. W. & SCOTT, W. R. (1983) Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality, Sage, London. For recent research of Levidow, see www.open.ac.uk/personalpages/l.levidow or of the Biotechnology Policy Group, Center for Technology Strategy of Open University, see www-tec.open.ac.uk/cts/bpg.htm.
8 As deliberately as is the case with GMO field trials, i.e. set up as an experiment.
9 Informative were e.g. the declarations of Isabelle Stengers and S?bastien Denys (a.o. accused of having destroyed field trials of GMOs) at the court case of ’GMO decontaminators’, held in Namur (Belgium), November 17th of 2003.
10 I made/make some steps in arguing this case. In an International Workshop ’Biotechnology, Patents and Morality: Towards a consensus’ (17-19 January 1996, University of Gent), I asked for not debating biotechnology at a purely abstract, theoretical, idealized, symbolical level, "For it is the only opportunity, the only platform left to face a difficult-to-cope-with intertwining of nature and culture, indeed, to face our nowadays human living condition" (DE WAELE, D. "The Virtual reality of the biotechnology debate", in Biotechnology, Patents and Morality, S. Sterckx, Ed., Ashgate, Aldershot, 1997, p. 128-135). And, in the above referred "Veel ethiek voor weinig veld Oversized ethics for a small field" (DE WAELE, D. 1997/1998), I made a plea for an ethics of ’valueing’ (i.e. a concrete, specific, dynamic, personal and experiential process) instead of an ethics of ’values’ (i.e. abstract, general, ideal, static, timeless, impersonal and lifeless concepts) and I thereby referred to the concept of ’ethics’ by Ludwig WITTGENSTEIN (as expressed e.g. in a Dutch edition, based on notations during his lectures, Colleges over ethiek, esthetica, psychologie en religieus geloof, Boom, Meppel-Amsterdam, 1979). He preferred an ethics of striving for reconciliation with ’the self’ over a morality addressed to ’the other’. According to this concept, ethics cannot be moulded into a proposition of higher value than another proposition, and ethics cannot be considered separately from acting. Eventually, in a forthcoming Dutch paper, I am rethinking my ’moral position’ regarding biotechnology: I try to ’post-modernize’ Hegel’s view on history (more specific, his concept of ’the cunning of reason’), mixing it with Wittgenstein’s view on ethics (working title "Hegel en biotechnologie: Een ’monologue int?rieur’ over Wetenschap, Technologie en Kapitalisme").
11 DEWACHTER, W. (2003), edited by Acco, Leuven/Leusden, a revision of Dewachter’s Besluitvorming in politiek Belgi? (1992).
12 ALBAECK, E. (1995) "Between knowledge and power: utilization of social science in public policy making", Policy Sciences 28: 79-100.
13 LINDBLOM, C.E. (1980) The policy-making process, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, cited in BULMER, M. (1987) Social science research and government: comparative essays on Britain and the United States, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
14 HEYWOOD, A. (2002) Politics, Palgrave Foundations, New York [p. 401].
15 ALBAECK, E. (1995) o.c.; BULMER, M. (Ed.) (1986) Social science and social policy, (Social science and policy, 12), London, Allen & Unwin.
16 ALBAECK, E. (1995) o.c.; CAPLAN, N. (1979) "The use of social science knowledge in policy decisions at the national level", in Social science policy: United States case studies, OECD, Paris; DYER (1987) "The role of social science in policy-making", PhD, University of Ashton, Birmingham, UK, in Dissertation Abstracts International, C., vol. 48, no. 3, fall [p. 480]; LAMPINEN, O. (1992) The utilization of social science research in public policy, VAPK-publishing, Helsinki; REIN, M. (1980) "Methodology for the study of the interplay between social science and social policy", International social science journal, vol. XXXII, no. 2; WEISS, C.H. (1986) The many meanings of research utilization, cited in BULMER, M. (Ed.) (1986) o.c.
17 Cf. De Morgen, 15.05.2004 and 25.06.2004.